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Visit of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to 
Belarus gave a new impetus to the discussions related to the EU and Belarus dialogue. This event 
may be assessed both rationally and emotionally. Thinking in rational terms this seems to be a clear-
cut signal to Minsk that the EU is prepared to commence a new stage of pragmatic relations. On the 
one hand, this stands to reason since a passive stance and attempts to isolate Belarus brought no 
concrete results. On the other hand, assessing those alterations emotionally, an impression is formed 
that the EU made a cynical and amoral step by forgetting all sins of the regime.
Inconsistency of the EU
Two years ago the EU proclaimed a document to the authorities of Belarus wherein it clearly pointed 
out that the democratic reforms were a precondition for a closer cooperation. Prior to the election of 
2008 A. Lukashenka’s regime released political prisoners, gave a permit to register the movement of 
the former competitor A. Milinkevich and lifted the ban from two opposition newspapers. There 
were different opinions – from positive asserting that those were essential changes, to pessimistic 
claiming that those alterations were simply cosmetic.
Nevertheless, in the opinion of the expert on Belarus Alexandra Goujon (Bourgogne University, 
France)  “Having  made  some  concessions  to  its  opponents  and  having  slackened  the  rein,  an 
authoritarian regime fails to become democratic, it simply becomes less authoritarian”. This way or 
another, dynamics of the EU-Belarus relations shows that the majority of the Brussels’ requirements 
are if not forgotten, then simply not emphasized. True, J. Solana has met some of the opposition 
representatives but even after that stricter statements or concrete proposals related to human rights 
and democratic values were not made.
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Content of the Meeting
Irrespective of the fact that  many people consider the meeting of J.  Solana with the Belarusian 
authorities to be an unprecedented event, the basic question that arises is related to the content of the 
given meeting. As Antoliy Lebedko, one of the Belarusian opposition leaders argues, “It is not the 
visit  that is important, it  is what J.  Solana’s briefcase contained”. Comments of the EU foreign 
policy leader and his answers to the journalists’ questions give no clue what the results of the visit 
might be.  Belarusian leader also stayed secretive.
 It is hardly feasible that for the Belarusian society, that found itself in the mist of high-sounding 
phrases about the “constructive dialogue” and “discussion of the essential problems”, the policy of 
the EU seems transparent. Let alone the fact that so far the EU failed to draw up an action plan for 
the normalization of the EU and Belarus relations. A plan that would provide for the measurable 
criteria to assess the progress of the reforms carried out in Belarus.
Situation of the Opposition
Supporters of rational politics would maintain that the work with the Belarusian opposition for more 
than  a  decade  failed  to  produce  any  tangible  results.  Strict  rhetoric  and  sanctions  to  the  A. 
Lukashenka’s regime also proved to be the examples of inefficient EU policy.
A. Lebedko argues that the EU passes on to the tète-à-tète dialogue format. A. Lukashenka expressed 
his  wish  to  communicate  with  Brussels  directly  without  any  mediators  –  leaders  of  opposition 
parties,  public  actors  and  non-governmental  organizations  –  quite  candidly:  “I  would  like  no 
mediators in  our dialogue and especially  those who fail  to show good will  to our country.  No 
mediators inside the country or outside it.”
Supporters of the democratic Belarus find themselves in an ambiguous situation. Representatives of 
the opposition, who for a long time supported the European values and were thereupon imprisoned 
by the regime, are not so sure now about the EU stance. J.  Solana failed to mention either the 
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entrepreneurs who were recently imprisoned in Belarus, or the forceful conscription of the leaders of 
the youth  opposition  movements,  or  cosmetic  changes  of  the regime,  which  are  insufficient  to 
commence a mutual dialogue. In its turn, making use of the Brussels’ silence Belarusian regime 
receives a chance to find out what the limits of the behaviour that may be tolerated by the EU are.
Especially  skeptical  in  this  sense  was  one  of  the  independent  Belarusian  expert  Viacheslav 
Pazdnyak. According to the analyst, within the context of the dispersal of peaceful demonstrations 
and the act of the burning of the EU flag by the police officers in Minsk, reaction of the EU is 
inadequate and worsening its image.
Causes of the Changes
Changes in the EU foreign policy towards Belarus were called forth by some factors. First,  the 
absence of a long-term strategy related to Belarus. EU fails to possess either any clearly defined 
instruments to influence Belarus, or the strategy and tactics of their use. This gives a possibility to 
alter the foreign policy course in the light of the existing conditions. And by the end of 2008 the 
international as well as economic conditions did change considerably.
Second, it is economic factors. It is nobody’s secret that quite a few EU states have their economic 
interests in Belarus. Besides, the consequences of the economic crisis make Minsk start looking for 
alternative sources itself. Reciprocal interests determine the commercialization of mutual relations.
Third, naturally, is Moscow. On the one hand, it is agreed that if the EU fails to be active in its 
relations with Belarus, the latter “will find itself” in the sphere of complete influence of Russia. This 
attitude was consolidated by the Russian aggression in Georgia. On the other hand, it is for some 
years already that A. Lukashenka himself makes attempts to keep balance between the West and the 
East. The issue of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is one of the basic Minsk’s tools of 
manipulation.
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Thus J. Solana’s visit may be assessed in different ways: as a chance for Belarus seeking mutually 
beneficial  cooperation and as cynical step of the EU by keeping silent  about human rights and 
democratic values. However, talking about the chance, we have to ask, whether it is a chance to 
liberalize the political and social life and economics, or to receive an economic and financial benefit. 
And, second, is this a chance for the Belarusian society, or a chance for the ruling elite to stay in 
power?
What has to be done?
Critical attitude to J. Solana’s visit does not mean that democratically minded part of the Belarusian 
society  assesses  negatively  the  very  dialogue  of  the  EU  and  Belarus.  Such  stance  simply 
demonstrates the fear that the representatives of the opposition will not get any chairs in the given 
dialogue.
Independent  Belarusian  experts  are  of  the  opinion  that  for  the  EU and Belarusian  dialogue  to 
promote democratic processes, and not the authoritarianism, the European Union must at present 
devise  a  plan  on  the  normalization  of  mutual  relations.  This  means  that  the  delegation  of  the 
European Commission in Belarus and the team of the European Commission working with Belarus 
in Brussels have to be reinforced.
Rationally thinking, actions of the EU seem to be logical – work with the opposition failed to be 
fruitful, thus alternatives have to be sought. One of them could be an attempt to introduce changes 
from the top,  to tame the authorities and little by little “push forward” the democratic changes. 
Lithuanian experts, however, are right in stating that EU conditions have to be softer that those of 
Russia. This means that promotion of democratic values will be very restricted.
The emotional side, seemingly, has the right to fear that cooperation of Belarus and the EU threatens 
to turn into a real simulation of democratization. Simulation, whereby participants of the dialogue 
will pursue their economic goals,  will  publicize cosmetic, allegedly democratic reforms, perhaps 
some opposition players will be invited to join the game.
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There’s no use crying over the spilt  milk.  The visit  did take place,  democratic values were not 
mentioned. At present,  the main challenge for the EU is  to find ways to inform the Belarusian 
society. To give information on what has been agreed upon. To draw attention to the fact that it is 
not only the elite of power that is important for the EU, but ordinary people of Belarus as well. To 
inform that such meetings may not legitimize all crimes committed by the regime. Lithuania as the 
member state of the EU and the closest neighbour can make an important contribution to the given 
work.
Otherwise  the greater  part  of  the  Belarusian  society  will  continue  to  suppose  that  humble  EU 
officials arrive to the Minsk Tsar.
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